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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter the "Fed-
eral Rules") permit parties to civil actions in federal courts to dis-
cover the opinions and conclusions of any expert witness that a
party-opponent expects to call as a witness at trial.1 Federal rule
26 governs discovery of these experts and provides several different
but integrated techniques for compelling disclosure of informa-
tion,2 including written interrogatories s and court ordered
depositions.4
The provisions of rule 26(b)(4) resulted from a protracted de-
bate by courts and commentators over the merits of permitting
discovery of expert witnesses.' Federal rule 26(b)(4) strongly af-
firms the idea that. adequate discovery of expert witnesses is essen-
tial to their effective cross-examination in today's complex and
highly technical civil cases.6
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
2. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 543 (4th ed. 1983).
.3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) & 33.
4. See id. at 26(a) & 27-32. A 1941 study of pretrial discovery revealed that parties
used oral depositions more than any other discovery device. See A. Stockman, Some Statis-
tical Observations on the Operation of Discovery and Related Provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 21 (1942) (unpublished study, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts), cited in Note, Dead Men Tell No Tales: Admissibility of Civil Depositions upon
Failure of Cross-examination, 65 VA. L. REv. 153, 154 n.11 (1979).
5. See infra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
6. "Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation.
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Parties to civil actions enjoy an absolute right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses at trial.7 A party seeking discovery of a party-op-
ponent's expert witness in preparation for cross-examination and
rebuttal of the expert at trial, however, lacks sufficient preparation
to cross-examine or rebut the expert's responses to discovery ques-
tions. An expert's testimony during a discovery deposition,8 there-
fore, is not subject to true cross-examination but, nevertheless, still
is potentially admissible at trial against the discovering party. This
anomaly arises because rule 32(a)(3) permits any party to use the
deposition of a witness "for any purpose" if the witness becomes
unavailable9 to testify at trial.10 Thus, if a party to a civil action
deposed an expert witness pursuant to rule 26(b)(4), and the ex-
pert subsequently became unavailable to testify at trial within the
meaning of rule 32(a)(3), a federal district court judge, under the
Federal Rules as they presently exist, probably would permit intro-
duction of the deposition into evidence against the deposing
party. 1 A party who desires to depose a party-opponent's expert
witness in such cases faces the quandary of deposing the oppo-
nent's expert witness to prepare effectively for cross-examination
and thereby risking that opposing counsel will use the deposition
against him at trial.1 2
The system of discovery that the Federal Rules establish theo-
retically entitles all parties in civil actions, prior to commencement
of trial, to disclosure of all relevant nonprivileged information in
The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular
approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on
the stand." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
7. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931); United States v.
Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952); 4 B. JONES, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 25:1, at 106 (6th ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1974).
8. Although the Federal Rules do not distinguish between discovery and evidentiary
depositions, recognizable practical differences distinguish them. See infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 44-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unavailability
requirement in rule 32(a)(3).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
11. The problem of using discovery deposition testimony against a discovering party
exists with depositions of all witnesses, but the arguments against permitting this technique
are most compelling in the context of expert witness depositions.
12. A 1976 survey revealed that counsel deposes the opponent's expert in approxi-
mately 60% of the cases in which opposing counsel expects the expert to testify at trial.
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part Two, an Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 175 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Graham, Part Two].
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the possession of any person.13 Thus, federal discovery rules should
not force litigants to choose between failing to depose a party-op-
ponent's expert witness and thereby preparing inadequately for
trial, and deposing the expert witness and consequently risking
that opposing counsel will use the deposition against him at trial
without the benefit of cross-examination. Part H of this Note re-
views common law disagreement over the appropriateness of ex-
pert witness discovery and the acceptance of the principle under
the Federal Rules. Part III discusses the procedural mechanics of
discovering an expert witness and demonstrates the potential for
use of such a deposition against the discovering party. Part IV re-
views the judicial history of the expert witness deposition problem
and demonstrates that courts have ignored the policy reasons that
favor remedying this procedural problem. Part V discusses the in-
equities that the expert witness deposition problem causes. It con-
cludes that courts, by admitting discovery depositions of expert
witnesses against the deposing party, not only have controverted
the basic purposes of pretrial discovery, but also erroneously have
eliminated the process of deposing the witness of a party-opponent
as a pretrial discovery technique by effectively recharacterizing it
as an extension of formal trial proceedings that presume the de-
posing party engaged in full pretrial preparation. Part V then ex-
plores several possible methods courts and rulemakers could em-
ploy to solve this problem, including an amendment to rule 26.
II. LEGAL HISTORY CONCERNING DIsCovERY OF EXPERT
WITNESSES
A. Common Law Disagreement Over the Appropriateness
of Discovering Expert Witnesses
Before adoption of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules,
most courts did not permit parties to discover information from
13. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 540. Professor Charles Wright described the scope of
discovery that Federal Rule 26 authorizes as follows:
The scope of discovery contemplated by Rule 26 is extremely broad. "No longer
can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquir-
ing into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Discovery may extend to matters
relating to the claim or defense of any party, unlike the former equity practice that
limited discovery to matters in support of the proponent's case. It is no objection that
the examining party already knows the facts as to which he seeks discovery, since one
of the purposes of discovery is to ascertain the position of the adverse party on the
controverted issues.
Id. at 543-44 & nn.27-30 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)) (footnotes
omitted).
1618 [Vol. 36:1615
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experts whom party-opponents hired as witnesses or consultants. 14
These courts characterized expert information as privileged and
articulated several reasons for this characterization. First, some
courts stated that an expert's status as an expert rendered the in-
formation in his possession privileged.'5 Second, some courts rea-
soned that expert information fell within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.16 Third, some courts felt that expert information
constituted attorney work product and protected it with a qualified
privilege. 17 Last, some courts prohibited discovery simply because
they felt that allowing a party to obtain free access to information
for which a party-opponent had paid by hiring an expert was un-
fair. 18 Courts that did allow discovery of expert witnesses fre-
quently restricted it to certain circumstances or limited the
amount or type of disclosure a discovering party could obtain.
Some courts, for example, permitted parties to discover the infor-
mation that formed the basis of an expert's conclusions, but not
the conclusions themselves.' 9 Other courts allowed parties to dis-
cover only expert employees of a party-opponent. 20 Although
14. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 116-119 (1966).
15. See American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685
(D.R.I. 1959); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.N.J. 1954); Lewis v.
United Air Lines Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
16. Some courts have applied the attorney-client privilege not only to communications
between expert witnesses and attorneys, but also to the expert's knowledge. See
Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 462-69. One line of decisions based this application of the
attorney-client privilege on the theory that the expert was acting as a mere "conduit," relay-
ing and interpreting the client's information to the attorney. Id.; see City & County of San
Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); Webb v. Francis J. Lewald
Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931); Rust v. Roberts, 171 Cal. App. 2d 772, 341 P.2d 46
(3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Another court characterized an expert as an assistant to an attor-
ney and, therefore, held that the attorney-client privilege protected the expert from being
subject to questioning at a deposition. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
7 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Mass. 1947).
17. The attorney work product privilege prohibits litigants from discovering the "writ-
ten statements and mental impressions of opposing counsel" absent a showing of necessity.
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947). Some courts have extended this privilege
to information that an attorney obtains from an expert, reasoning that this information
becomes protected once it reaches the hands of an attorney. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 218 (D. Del. 1960); United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 25 F.R.D. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1959); White Pine Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
166 F. Supp. 148, 162-63 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
18. See Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 479-88. See also United States v. 23.76 Acres of
Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596-97 (D. Md. 1963) (suggesting that the court can alleviate any un-
fairness in discovery costs by ordering the discovering party to pay).
19. Long, supra note 14, at 118.
20. Id. at 119.
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courts treated discovery of expert witnesses inconsistently,21 courts
that followed the predominant judicial trend either completely re-
stricted discovery of experts or placed severe limitations upon it.
2 2
The primary factor that motivated courts to prohibit or re-
strict discovery of expert witnesses was the fear that it would pro-
mote lazy advocacy by allowing attorneys to rely on the work of
opposing counsel to help them prepare their cases. 2 s By imposing
stringent limitations on discovery of expert witnesses, courts left
attorneys inadequately prepared to face modern cases that concern
complex, highly technical matters, and to counter the increased use
of expert testimony that these cases often demand. 4 Attorneys,
therefore, increasingly faced the prospect of cross-examining ex-
pert witnesses at trial without previously obtaining the information
necessary to develop an effective strategy of rebuttal.2 5 This situa-
tion totally subverted one of the main purposes of discovery: to
"make a trial less a game of blind man's buff [sic] and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest prac-
ticable extent."28
21. See id. at 117-19.
22. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
918 (1981).
23. Friedenthal, supra note 14, at 488. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules,
recognizing that this concern was the basis for the restrictions on discovery of expert wit-
nesses, stated that "[p]ast judicial restrictions on discovery of an adversary's expert, partic-
ularly as to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other's
better preparation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
24. Cases that concern complex subject matter often create a "battle of the experts"
scenario. See Friedenthal, supra note 14; Getzoff, Direct and Cross-examination of an Ex-
pert-Some Suggestions Concerning "How to Do It", 22 TIAL LAW. GUIDE 267, 267 (1978).
In these cases, expert testimony often determines which party ultimately will prevail. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; see United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc.,
26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
25. In United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963), the court
stated "that an expert is the most difficult witness to cross-examine, particularly if one is
unaware until trial of the substance of his testimony." Id. at 596.
26. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). In light of this
disturbing trend, Professor Jack Friedenthal, see Friedenthal, supra note 14, and others, see
Long, supra note 14, posed vehement arguments for reform of laws governing discovery of
expert witnesses. In addition, some courts became more receptive to the idea of discovering
expert witnesses, and several opinions revealed greater judicial awareness of the relationship
between pretrial discovery and effective cross-examination and rebuttal at trial. See United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 41
F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Texas 1966); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md.
1963). The increasing judicial awareness of the positive need for expert discovery, however,
failed to rectify inconsistent treatment of the expert witness issue among jurisdictions. See
infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
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B. Enactment of Federal Rule 26(b)(4): Discovery of Expert
Witnesses Permitted in Federal Courts
Congress responded to increasing judicial awareness of the
need for discovery of expert witnesses by adopting rule 26(b)(4) as
part of the 1970 amendment to the Federal Rules." In addition to
liberalizing discovery of expert witnesses, rule 26(b)(4) also con-
tains provisions that prevent discovering parties from enjoying un-
fair benefits in the discovery process. For example, rule 26(b)(4)
grants courts discretion to impose limited restrictions on the scope
of discovery28 and to order the discovering party to pay the party-
opponent "a fair portion of the fees and expenses" that the party-
opponent reasonably incurs "in obtaining facts and opinions from
the expert. '2 9 The rule also limits discovery, except in special cir-
cumstances 0 to expert witnesses the party-opponent expects to
call at trial.3 1 Moreover, discovering parties may depose expert wit-
nesses only by securing a court order.32 Thus, rule 26(b)(4)'s time
limitations, which allow depositions of expert witnesses only after
the party-opponent designates such witnesses for trial, coupled
with the power it gives judges to limit the scope of disclosure and
to require the discovering party to share in paying the expert wit-
ness' fees, effectively eliminates the danger of discovering parties
benefiting unfairly from a party-opponent's trial preparation.
III. DEPOSING EXPERT WITNESSES: HIDDEN DANGER FOR
DEPOSING PARTIES IN FEDERAL RuLE 32(a)(3)
Although rulemakers drafted rule 26(b)(4) to keep parties who
sought discovery of expert witnesses from benefiting unfairly, they
ironically overlooked the possibility that courts, pursuant to rule
32(a)(3), would bestow inequitable rewards upon discovered par-
ties. Rule 32(a)(3) provides that the "deposition of a witness...
may be used by any party for any purpose. . . " if certain condi-
tions arise-primarily unavailability of a witness to testify at
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
28. FEn. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
29. Id. at 26(b)(4)(C).
30. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits discovery of experts that a party-opponent does not ex-
pect to call at trial as provided in rule 35(b) "or upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means." Id. at 26(b)(4)(B).
31. Id. at 26(b)(4).
32. Id. at 26(b)(4)(A).
1983] 1621
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trial." Rule 32(a)(3) does not "evince a distinction as to admissi-
bility at trial between a deposition taken solely for purposes of dis-
covery and one taken for use at trial... "; 1 nor does a review of
its legislative history reveal such a distinction." If a party deposes
a party-opponent's expert witness solely for discovery purposes in
preparation for trial, therefore, the party-opponent can submit the
deposition into evidence against the deposing party under rule
32(a) if the expert witness becomes unavailable to testify.36 Conse-
quently, the deposed party could admit into evidence the deposi-
tion of his unavailable expert's opinions and conclusions without
subjecting them to in-court cross-examination by the deposing
party.3 7
A. The Process of Discovering Expert Witnesses and the
Deposition Problem
A party who anticipates that a party-opponent plans to use an
expert witness at trial typically submits an interrogatory to that
party requiring him to identify any experts which he expects to
call at trial and to state the subject matter and summarize the sub-
stance of the expert's anticipated testimony.3 8 The responses to the
interrogatories typically are not adequate to help the requesting
party prepare an effective cross-examination. 9 Thus, the request-
ing party, by order 0 or by agreement with the party-opponent,
usually deposes the expert identified in the party-opponent's inter-
rogatory responses. Although the parties may specify whether the
deposition is for discovery purposes only, for use at trial, or for
unlimited purposes, 4 1 these designations do not seem to affect the
operation of rule 32.42 The Federal Rules do not require absolutely
that a party who identified an expert as a trial witness produce the
witness at trial because uncontrollable circumstances often prevent
33. Id. at 32(a)(3).
34. Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
35. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); 4A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 30.50, at 30-38 (2d ed. 1981).
36. See infra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
39. Professor Graham's survey suggests that most practitioners find the interrogatory
an unsatisfactory method of providing trial preparation. Graham, Part Two, supra note 12,
at 172.
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
41. See, e.g., Inland Bonding Co. v. Mainland Nat'l Bank, 3 F.R.D. 438 (D.N.J. 1944).
42. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:16151622
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the expert's attendance.43 When such circumstances arise, there-
fore, the party who hired the expert can invoke rule 32(a)(3) and
introduce into evidence the deposition that opposing counsel took
for discovery purposes.
B. The Unavailability Requirement of Rule 32(a)(3)
The essential requirement under rule 32(a)(3) for admitting
the deposition of a witness into evidence is unavailability of the
deposed witness for testimony at trial. The unavailability require-
ments of rule 32(a)(3) reflect the traditional judical preference for
live testimony over recorded testimony" by permitting the admis-
sion of deposition evidence only when appearance of the witness is
impossible or impractical, or when "exceptional circumstances"
render admission of the deposition desirable.45 The unavailability
provisions of rule 32(a)(3) provide insight into the degree that the
rule emphasizes the preference for live testimony, and illustrate
the ways an expert deposition can become admissible at trial.
1. Rule 32(a)(3)(A): Death of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(A) permits parties to use depositions for any
purpose if the court finds that the deposed witness is dead. Admis-
sion of depositions under this provision has provoked very little
controversy" because unavailability due to death is easy to demon-
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3).
44. See, e.g., Lamb v. Globe Seaways, Inc., 516 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1975); Salsman v.
Witt, 466 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1972). The traditional judicial preference for live testimony
derives from the desire of courts to afford factfinders the opportunity to observe the de-
meanor of witnesses during testimony. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir.
1946) (stating that "the demeanor of witnesses is recognized as a highly useful, even if not
an infallible, method of ascertaining the truth and accuracy of their narratives."); Napier v.
Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1939) (in which Judge Learned Hand stated that
"[t]he deposition has always been, and still is, treated as a substitute,. . . not to be used
when the original is at hand" because the party against whom the deposition is used is
denied the advantage of having the witness appear in front of the jury.). Federal Rules
32(a)(3)(E) and 43(a) expressly recognize the importance of allowing factfinders to observe
the demeanor of witnesses. Rule 32(a)(3)(E), which governs the use of depositions in trial
proceedings, emphasizes "the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
open court." Rule 43(a), which concerns the form and admissibility of evidence at trial,
provides that "[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided ... by these rules."
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
46. Cases in which the deposed witnesses died before the deposition was complete,
however, present a problem analogous to the principle issue in this Note. See cases cited
infra note 87. For a full discussion of these cases, see Note, supra note 4.
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strate and seldom is subject to abuse.' As with all other forms of
unavailability under rule 32(a)(3), the party seeking to admit the
deposition into evidence bears the burden of proving that the wit-
ness is dead."8
2. Rule 32(a)(3)(B): Absence of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(B), which permits parties to introduce a deposi-
tion into evidence when the witness is more than one hundred
miles from the place of trial or hearing, has spawned more litiga-
tion than any other unavailability provision and probably is the
most frequently abused criteria in the area of expert testimony.
Many courts have interpreted the 100 mile rule, and most have
construed it liberally.49 The party offering the deposition into evi-
dence bears the burden of establishing that the deponent meets
the distance requirements for unavailability.50 This burden of
proof, however, is not difficult to overcome. In Ikerd v Lapworth,51
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the trial court could judicially notice that the wit-
ness' place of residence was more than 100 miles from the place of
trial for purposes of admitting his deposition.5 2 More recently in
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,58 however, the Federal District Court
of Connecticut adopted a narrower view of the 100 mile rule. The
court held that it would not admit a deposition into evidence if the
deposed witness either resided or regularly worked within 100
miles of the place of trial "when the deposition [was] offered [in
evidence], or at a time during the proponent's case when a trial
subpoena could have been served" upon the deposed witness.5
47. The death of deposed witness provision in rule 32(a)(3) is not subject to abuse
presumably because few parties would procure the death of a witness so that they could use
a deposition instead of live testimony.
48. See, e.g., National Screw & Mfg. Co. v. Voi-Shan Indus., Inc., 347 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1965) (holding that the lower court properly excluded a deposition from evidence when a
party offered it pursuant to former rule 26 without showing the existence of circumstances
making the rule applicable).
49. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Transcontinental Energy Corp. v. Pacific Energy Resources, 683 F.2d
326, 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
51. 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 205. See also Frederick v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1952) (court
admitted deposition upon plaintiff's representation that the witness was out of town).
53. 77 F.R.D.-16 (D. Conn. 1977).
54. Id. at 18. See Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1345 (8th Cir. 1976); Ikerd
v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d at 205. But see United States v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
90 F.R.D. 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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The 100 mile requirement in rule 32(a)(3)(B) contains, as the
sole means of controlling abuse, the qualification that a deposition
is inadmissible when the party offering the deposition into evi-
dence procures the witness' absence.5 5 Courts, however, have been
very reluctant to find that a party procured the absence of a de-
posed witness. Courts carefully have distinguished a party's act of
procuring a witness' absence from the failure to facilitate his pres-
ence.5 To exclude a deposition under this provision, a party ap-
parently must meet the difficult burden of showing that the party
who sought admission of the deposition actively tried to keep the
deposed witness out of the courtroom.57
Courts arguably should scrutinize attempted admissions of ex-
pert witness depositions more closely under the 100 mile require-
ment of rule 32(a)(3)(B) than attempted admissions of depositions
of nonexpert witnesses. Today, parties frequently hire expert wit-
nesses who live and work more than 100 miles from the place of
trial.5 8 These experts typically receive substantial compensation
for consulting, testifying, and travel expenses.5 9 Ordinary wit-
nesses, however, usually receive only nominal statutory compensa-
tion because they accidently observed a particular event, not be-
cause they possess any valuable expertise.60 Thus, because experts
are very costly and often live outside the 100 mile zone, parties
who hire them are more likely to abuse the 100 mile requirement
by not paying the expert to return for trial than parties who seek
attendance of nonexpert witnesses." Nevertheless, most authori-
ties treat expert and nonexpert witnesses identically under the 100
mile requirement for purposes of determining their unavailability
and whether their depositions are admissible.2
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B).
56. See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D. Md. 1962); see also
United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 383 n.10 (citing Houser
202 F. Supp. at 189); Richmond v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1955) (court held that
party did not procure his own absence); M.S.D. Inc. v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 85, 91
n.16 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
57. Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 189.
58. For a nationwide list of expert witness sources, see Kirk, Locating Scientific and
Technical Experts, in 2 AM. JUR. TRIALs 293 (1964).
59. See Strodel, The Expert Witness: The Cornerstone of the Medical Negligence
Case, TRiAL No. 6, June 1982, at 37, 38.
60. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973).
61. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
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3. Rule 32(a)(3)(C): Age, Illness, Infirmity, and Imprisonment
of the Deposed Witness
Rule 32(a)(3)(C) permits courts to admit a witness' deposition
if "the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness,
infirmity, or imprisonment."8 Again, the party seeking admission
of the deposition bears a relatively light burden of proving that
one of these factors prevents the witness' attendance at trial.8 4 If a
party can use this unavailability provision to admit a witness' dep-
osition into evidence, other unavailability provisions such as the
100 mile and exceptional circumstances exceptions also may be
available to the party. 5 If a witness is in prison, a party may seek
to exclude the deposition by moving the court to use its discre-
tion66 to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which
compels the prisoner to appear and testify at trial.6 7
4. Rule 32(a)(3)(D): Inability to Procure Attendance of the
Deposed Witness by Subpoena
If a party is unable to compel a deposed witness' attendance at
trial by subpoena, the witness' deposition is admissible into evi-
dence under rule 32(a)(3)(D)6 8 This provision, together with the
100 mile provision in rule 32(a)(3)(B), presents uncertainty about
whether a party who shows that a deposed witness is outside the
100 mile zone also must prove that he unsuccessfully tried to sub-
poena the witness. Rule 45(e)69 suggests that witnesses who are
more than 100 miles from the place of trial are not subject to sub-
poena. This simple answer, however, overlooks at least two situa-
tions that possibly could arise under the Federal Rules. First, rule
45(e) subjects witnesses to service of a subpoena at any place
within the judicial district. Some judicial districts, because of their
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(C).
64. See supra notes 48 & 50 and accompanying text.
65. See Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 202 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (witness
was ill at time of trial, and court admitted deposition, citing 32(a)(3)(B) and (E)).
66. See Murray v. United States, 138 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1943).
67. On the other hand, a court need not let an imprisoned plaintiff come to trial when
his deposition is available. See Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd with-
out op., Ball v. Shamblin, 529 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976), aff'd
without op., Ball v. Dwye'r, 538 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, Ball v. Woods, 541 F.2d
279 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(D).
69. Rule 45(e) provides in pertinent part: "A subpoena... may be served at any
place within the district, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the
place of the hearing. . . ." Id. at 45(e).
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geographical size, require witnesses to travel more than 100 miles
from their place of residence to testify.70 Second, in certain statu-
tory causes of action, federal courts have nationwide subpoena
power under rule 45(e)(1).71 In cases in which either of these two
situations has arisen parties unsuccessfully have argued that the
100 mile provision which permits admissibility of depositions is in-
applicable when the deposed witness is subject to a court's sub-
poena power. 2 Federal courts, however, currently hold that parties
may admit depositions of witnesses into evidence under the 100
mile requirement without demonstrating that they attempted to
subpoena the witness. 3 Thus, the significance of the subpoena re-
quirement in determining whether a deposed witness is unavailable
is questionable, and very few cases construing the subpoena re-
quirement have arisen.
The question whether a party can subpoena an expert witness
to testify when his only connection with the case is that he con-
sulted with one of the parties has gained considerable attention. If
a party cannot compel such testimony, then any time he wishes to
introduce the deposition of an expert witness the party simply
must motion the court to issue a subpoena and, if the witness fails
to respond, offer the deposition into evidence under rule
32(a)(3)(D). The United States Supreme Court stated in
Branzburg v. Hayes1 ' that "'the public ... has a right to every
man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitu-
70. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1977).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 23 (1976) (nationwide subpoena power in antitrust suits when
the United States is plaintiff). The note on amendments to rule 45(e)(1), which discusses
justifications for giving federal courts nationwide subpoena power, states the following:
The last clause of the second sentence in Rule 45(e)(1) was added in 1980. Previ-
ously a person could not be subject to a subpoena served on him more than 100 miles
from the place of the hearing even though the place of service and the site of the
hearing were within the same state. It was felt, however, that state rules of service
would adequately reflect the degree of hardship in travelling more than 100 miles
within the state, and, therefore, there was no justification for greater federal
restrictions.
72. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 379-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 16, 17 n.2 (D. Conn. 1977); Houser v.
Snap-On Tools, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D. Md. 1962). But see United States v. Empire
Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), afl'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). In Empire Gas the court, in a federal antitrust action, refused
to admit into evidence depositions that the government offered because the government did
not attempt to show unavailability of deposed witnesses. Id. at 912. The court remarked
that the government acted "in the face of its nationwide subpoena power," and, thus, sug-
gested that the government should have attempted to subpoena the witnesses. Id.
73. See supra authorities cited in note 72.
74. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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tional, common-law, or statutory privilege. '7 5 Experts under sub-
poena, however, do not enjoy a general privilege to refuse to testify
concerning their expert knowledge. 76 Rather, courts generally will
subpoena and compel an expert witness to testify concerning any
previously formed expert opinions.77 Most courts, however, proba-
bly would not force experts to testify against their will and, consid-
ering the value of an expert's time, would not subpoena an expert
unless circumstances warranted otherwise.7 8
5. Rule 32(a)(3)(E): Admissibility under Exceptional
Circumstances
Rule 32(a)(3)(E) is a catch-all provision that permits courts to
admit the deposition of a witness because of "exceptional circum-
stances.'79 Unlike other unavailability provisions of rule 32(a)(3)
which require the deposed witness to be physically unavailable to
testify at trial, the exceptional circumstances provision only re-
quires the party offering the deposition into evidence to show the
court that forcing a witness to testify at trial would be unfair. This
burden seems more difficult because proving unfairness necessi-
tates that parties satisfy more than simply factual tests which the
other provisions in rule 32(a)(3)(A)-(D) establish. 0
In United States v. Rollins,81 for example, the federal govern-
ment charged the appellee with selling heroin to an undercover
agent. The government tried to avoid producing the undercover
agent as a witness at trial. The government alleged "exceptional
circumstances" for introducing the agent's deposition into evidence
because the agent himself was under investigation, in an unrelated
case, for permitting an informant to take some heroin that the
agent had purchased.2 The government was unwilling to risk the
serious danger that cross-examination of the agent unduly would
have focused the investigation on the agent and caused harm to
75. Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
76. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976).
77. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973).
78. See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d at 821. Parties that face the problem of having
their discovery deposition of an expert witness used against them at trial should try to com-
pel the expert to testify by moving the court to subpoena the expert.
79. Fan. R. Crv. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
80. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
81. 487 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 411.
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the agent's reputation.83 The Second Circuit held that the agent
was not unavailable within the meaning of rule 32(a)(3)(E)'s excep-
tional circumstances provision and thus, refused to admit the dep-
osition. 4 The Second Circuit stated that a party could not argue
"that a deposition would be usable if the witness were alive and
well within the jurisdiction and subject to subpoena, simply be-
cause the party calling him wanted to preserve his identity or
wished not to expose him to unfair cross-examination." 5 The Rol-
lins decision suggests that the exceptional circumstances provision
in rule 32(a)(3)(E) seldom will provide an avenue for parties to ad-
mit depositions of expert witnesses into evidence against the de-
posing party. Moreover, the language of rule 32(a)(3)(E), which
contains the only statement in rule 32 that articulates a clear pref-
erence for live testimony over deposition evidence,"8 supports this
suggested proposition. Thus, parties who wish to introduce deposi-
tions of witnesses into evidence probably will have to rely prima-
rily on the provisions in rule 32(a)(3)(A)-(D) to achieve this
objective.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 412.
85. Id. See also Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 F. Supp. 714,
716 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a patent infringement suit, in which the court denied defendant's re-
quest to use at trial depositions of experts and other witnesses who would have observed the
defendant conducting inter partes tests on certain commercial material it produced if the
court had granted the defendant permission to conduct the tests. The defendant argued,
under the exceptional circumstances provision of rule 32(a)(3)(E), that because its commer-
cial equipment was too large to bring into and test in court, it could only give the court a
present sense impression of the test procedures by taking depositions of the test witnesses
while conducting the tests and introducing the depositions into evidence at trial. Id. In de-
nying the defendant's request to use the depositions at trial, the court reasoned as follows:
Witnesses frequently, in fact almost always, testify to impressions and observations of
events which take place outside the courtroom. The court must regularly make its deci-
sion from testimony concerning technical matters based on observations of events oc-
curring outside of the courtroom. This is hardly an "exceptional circumstance". There
is therefore no need to reduce defendant's experts' testimony to depositions before
trial.
Id. But see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 216 n.2 (D. Conn. 1977) (in which the
court stated that the length of an antitrust suit was an exceptional circumstance that justi-
fied using the deposition of a witness at trial rather than compelling the witness to testify in
court about "relatively non-controversial matters as to which the opportunity to assess cred-
ibility by observing the witness is not important.")
86. Rule 32(a)(3)(E) requires courts to give "due regard to the importance of present-
ing the testimony of witnesses orally in open court. . . ." Fan. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E).
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IV. JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE WITNESS DEPOSITION PROBLEM
Courts have expressed varying degrees of sensitivity for the ar-
guments of parties who challenge the propriety of admitting depo-
sitions of witnesses into evidence against a deposing party. In sev-
eral cases parties argued that allowing party-opponents to use
depositions at trial denied them their right to cross.-examine the
unavailable witness.87 Despite such arguments, courts universally
have admitted these depositions into evidence while offering ag-
grieved deposing parties little or no protection from the inequities
that resulted from these decisions.88
In Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co.,89 the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania recognized the potential
unfairness of admitting depositions of witnesses into evidence. The
plaintiff in Rosenthal deposed the driver of defendant's taxicab
solely for purposes of discovery.9 0 The witness later died and de-
fendant offered the deposition into evidence at the trial under rule
26(d), the predecessor to rule 32.91 Plaintiff moved to exclude the
deposition, arguing that he deposed the taxicab driver only for dis-
covery and that his counsel had no opportunity to cross-examine
the driver with leading questions because the witness was not
"hostile or recalcitrant." 92 The court admitted the deposition de-
spite plaintiff's arguments by reasoning that it did not have the
power to read a nonexistent restriction into rule 26(d).98 In recog-
nition of defendant's inability to cross-examine the taxicab driver,
however, the court admitted the deposition subject to "cautionary
87. See infra notes 89-113. A similar problem occurs concerning the admissibility of a
deposition of a witness at trial when the witness dies before the deposition is complete. In
these cases, parties have argued that the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
before he died should foreclose admission of the deposition. See, e.g., Derewecki v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 353 F.2d 436, 440 (3d Cir. 1965); Continental Can Co. v. Crown Cork &
Seal, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Inland Bonding Co. v. Mainland National
Bank, 3 F.R.D. 438, 439 (D.N.J. 1944). In each case, the court admitted the deposition by
finding either that the objecting party consented to the omission of cross-examination or by
holding that the value of the evidence outweighed the value of cross-examination. See Note,
supra note 4, at 159-71.
88. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
89. 26 F.R.D. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
90. Id. at 117.
91. As part of a general restructuring of discovery rules in 1970, the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee moved the portions of 26(d)(3) concerning use of depositions at trial to
rule 32(a)(3)(A). Note, supra note 4, at 155 n.17.
92. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 117. Ordinarily, counsel may not employ leading questions
on direct examination except when witness appears hostile. See, e.g., W. RICHARDSON, RICH-
ARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 483 (J. Prince ed. 1973).
93. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 117.
1630
EXPERT WITNESSES
instructions ...and such observations as the circumstance may
require . . . .", Thus, the Rosenthal court recognized the unfair-
ness inherent in admitting discovery depositions of witnesses who
have not undergone true cross-examination. 5 The court, however,
felt that the silence of the Federal Rules on this issue constrained
it and implicitly held that cautionary instructions were an ade-
quate protection against any unfairness to the discovering party.98
In Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co.,9 7 however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed lit-
tle concern for the plaintiff's argument that the court should not
admit the deposition of an inadequately cross-examined witness.
Defendant Dr. Pepper, upon notice to plaintiff Wright, had taken
the deposition of a witness whose testimony was crucial to Dr.
Pepper's case." The witness died prior to trial and Dr. Pepper of-
fered the deposition in evidence.9 9 Plaintiff argued that although it
had cross-examined the witness during the deposition, it had not
done so vigorously because it felt that the deposition was to serve
only discovery purposes. 00 The trial court admitted the deposition,
but on several occasions told the jury that it could give less weight
to the deposition than to live testimony which a party would have
subjected to in-depth cross-examination. 11 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that giving such instructions was reversible error.10 2
The court stated that under rule 26(d)(3), 10 3 "as a matter of right,
a party may introduce the deposition of a deceased witness with no
94. Id. at 118.
95. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
96. Rosenthal, 26 F.R.D. at 118.
97. 414 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 889-90. When Dr. Pepper objected to the court's cautionary instructions,
the trial judge said:
I think it was proper to point out to the jury all of the circumstances that might be
attended at the taking of a deposition for discovery purposes, versus a deposition for
perpetuation of testimony. Even with the presence of opposing counsel, so forth, cer-
tainly at a deposition for discovery, it's not unusual that you would not go into an in
depth cross-examination that you would, where you are going to perpetuate the testi-
mony. I think the jury was sufficiently charged on the point. I may not have mentioned
specifically, I cannot remember, now, that definitely counsel for both parties were
present.
Id. at 889-90 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 890-91.
103. Old rule 26(d)(3) was the predecessor to rule 32(a)(3). See supra note 91.
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strings attached. ' 10 4 The court reasoned that Wright's counsel pur-
posefully chose to limit his cross-examination of the witness at the
deposition and should have anticipated unexpected occurrences,
"including the necessity for using depositions when the deponent
has met an untimely death before trial."10 5 The court noted that
Wright failed to show that its failure to cross-examine the witness
during the deposition, as it had a right to do, prejudiced it at
trial.106 In addition, the court stated that Wright did not prove
that it could have obtained any evidence during cross-examination
that would have impeached the witness' testimony.10 7 Thus, unlike
the district court in Rosenthal, the Fifth Circuit held that a party
who fails to cross-examine a witness completely during a discovery
deposition has no right to cautionary instructions when a party-
opponent seeks to admit the deposition at trial.108
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered the most recent decision on the expert witness deposition
problem in United States v. International Business Machines
Corp. (IBM).'0 9 In IBM the government argued that it deposed
several prospective IBM witnesses purely for discovery purposes to
prepare for cross-examination.110 Moreover, the government argued
that the court should not permit IBM to use the depositions
against it at trial because rule 32(a)(3)(B) did not contemplate ad-
mission of discovery depositions.""" The court, however, stated that
rule 32 does not distinguish between depositions for discovery pur-
poses and those for use at trial.1 2 The court admitted the govern-
ment's deposition into evidence, reasoning that "admission of un-
104. Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d at 890.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 890-91. Eleven years later, the Fifth Circuit in Savoie v. LaFourche Boat
Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980), again demonstrated its unwillingness to go be-
yond the express language of rule 32(a)(3) by admitting the deposition of a witness against
the deposing party. In Savoie the defendant had deposed a witness who was outside the
United States during the trial and argued that admission of the deposition against it would
act as a disincentive for parties in future litigation to prepare properly for trial by taking
discovery depositions. Id. at 724. The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that the
language of rule 32(a)(3) foreclosed this type of argument, id., and admitted the deposition
under the relevant provision of rule 32(a)(3)(B). Id.
109. 90 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
110. Id. at 381.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 381. The court noted that the 1970 revisions to the Federal Rules removed
language from the Rules that distinguished between depositions purely for discovery pur-
poses and those for use at trial. The court perceived that this revision extinguished any
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favorable deposition records was a risk the government assumed
when it chose to limit its questioning."11
The courts that have addressed the witness deposition prob-
lem increasingly have been unwilling to consider seriously the po-
tential prejudice to the party against whom the court admits the
deposition. These courts apparently have embraced the idea that
parties who fail to conduct full cross-examinations during deposi-
tions assume the risk of having depositions of subsequently un-
available witnesses used against them at trial. This theory fails to
recognize the distinction between discovery and preparation of evi-
dence that exists in practice although rule 32(a)(3) fails to reflect
it. 11' The practical difference between these two procedures makes
use of expert witness depositions at trial unfair when the parties
intended to use them only for discovery.
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Expert Witness Deposition Problem: The Degree of
Unfairness
1. Absence of Proper Opportunity for Cross-Examination
Parties in the American judicial system enjoy an absolute
right to cross-examine opposing witnesses. 1 5 The purpose of cross-
examination is to give factfinders an opportunity to evaluate the
reliability of a witness' testimony by allowing the cross-examining
party to impeach the witness and elicit facts favorable to the cross-
examiner's case.11 ' The prior opportunity for cross-examination of
a witness, therefore, is the primary factor underlying the admission
of hearsay under the prior testimony exception.1 ' Similarly, this
opportunity also justifies the provisions of rule 32(a)(3) that allow
courts to admit depositions as substantive evidence when the de-
ponent subsequently becomes unavailable to testify at trial.1 8 Ad-
argument for a distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions. Id. at 381 n.7. See
Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. at 117.
113. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 381.
114. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 7.
116. 4 B. JoNEs, supra note 7, at § 25:1.
117. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. "According to Dean McCormick, 'the
premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard has been the
principle justification for the exclusion generally of hearsay statements, and for the admis-
sion as an exception to the hearsay rule of reported testimony taken at a former hearing.'"
Note, supra note 4, at 156 n.19 (citing C. MCCORMICK, McCORMIcK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 19, at 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)).
118. See Note, supra note 4, at 156 n.19.
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mission of discovery depositions into evidence against deposing
parties who only directly examine the deponent, therefore, in-
fringes upon the deposing parties' right of cross-examination.
(a) Dependence of Admissibility on Prior Cross-Examination
Rule 32(a)(3) does not contain an express requirement that
cross-examination occur as a prerequisite to admissibility of a dep-
osition. The rule, however, does permit use of depositions at trial
against only parties who were "present or represented... or who
had reasonable notice" of the taking of the deposition. "1 9 This lan-
guage implies that the party against whom a party-opponent seeks
to offer the deposition into evidence must have had an opportunity
to temper the deposition's impact through cross-examination.
Depositions, however, basically remain a form of hearsay,12
and courts and commentators have agreed that the total absence of
cross-examination precludes admission of a deposition.121 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence recognize the fundamental hearsay nature
of depositions and allow their admission only against a party who
previously "had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."12 Because
courts and commentators have read an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine requirement into rule 32(a),123 courts should admit deposi-
tions into evidence only against parties who had the opportunity to
"develop the testimony" through cross-examination. This require-
ment will ensure a deposition's reliability as evidence, and thus, its
admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule.124
119. FFD. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
120. 3 B. JoNEs, supra note 7, § 18:26 at 498.
121. See 4A, J. MooRa, MooRE's FEDRAL PRACTiCE 30.58, at 30-133 (2d ed. 1983);
Bobb v. Modem Products, Inc., 648 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1981). For example, in Du-
Beau v. Smither & Mayton, Inc., 203 F.2d 395, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1953), the court excluded
the deposition of a witness from evidence because the witness refused to disclose his resi-
dence or occupation when cross-examined at the deposition proceedings. The court reasoned
that the deponents refusal to reveal his place of abode or occupation substantially deprived
plaintiff of her right of cross-examination. Id. at 397.
122. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1). "Former testimony does not rely upon some set of cir-
cumstances to substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and opportunity
to cross-examine were present in fact." Id. advisory committee note.
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. Dean McCormick contends that lack of any opportunity to cross-examine an ab-
sent declarant is one of the main justifications for the hearsay exclusion of evidence:
It would be generally agreed today that the third factor is the main justification for the
exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-
examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is reported by the witness.
Thus as early as 1668 we find a court rejecting hearsay because "the other party could
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(b) Adequacy of Opportunity for Cross-Examination
The evaluation of whether a discovering party had an ade-
quate opportunity to cross-examine a deposed witness requires an
understanding of the practical difference between taking a deposi-
tion for discovery purposes and taking one for evidentiary pur-
poses. In choosing to depose a party-opponent's expert witness, a
party obviously does not desire to preserve the contents of the
deposition as evidence for use at trial because the expert's opinion
probably is harmful to the discovering party's position.12 Rather, a
party's primary purpose for deposing an expert witness is to ascer-
tain the crux of the expert's future testimony, which often exceeds
the scope of the deposing party's expertise, and to prepare an ef-
fective cross-examination strategy that rebuts the expert's testi-
mony.12 6 When taking evidentiary depositions, however, the depos-
ing party's counsel invariably seeks to preserve the contents of the
deposition for use at trial in the light most favorable to his cli-
ent-a task that is very difficult when examining an adverse expert
not cross-examine the party sworn." Judicial expressions stress this as a principal rea-
son for the hearsay rule. Cross-examination, as Bentham pointed out, was a distinctive
feature of the English trial system, and the one which most contributed to the prestige
of the institution of jury trial. He called it "a security for the correctness and complete-
ness of testimony." The nature of this safeguard which hearsay lacks is indicated by
Chancellor Kent: "Hearsay testimony is from the very nature of it attended with...
doubts and difficulties and it cannot clear them up. 'A person who relates a hearsay is
not obliged to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficul-
ties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambigui-
ties; he entrenches himself in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely on his dead or absent author.'. . . The plaintiff by means of this spe-
cies of evidence would be taken by surprise and be precluded from the benefit of a
cross-examination of S. as to all those material points which have been suggested as
necessary to throw full light on his information." Similarly, a Georgia judge has said
that cross-examination "is the most efficacious test which the law has devised for the
discovery of truth." Morgan analyzed the protective function of cross-examination and
concluded (1) that while the fear of exposure of falsehoods on cross-examination is a
stimulus to truth-telling by the witness, actual exposure of wilful falsehood is rarely
accomplished in actual practice and (2) that the most important service of cross-exami-
nation in present day conditions is in affording the opportunity to expose faults in the
perception and memory of the witness.
C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 116, at 583 (footnotes omitted).
125. The opponent would not hire an expert to testify at trial unless the expert's testi-
mony is favorable to his case.
126. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 511 F.2d 192, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1975),
af'd, 426 U.S. 929 (1976); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 72 (9th Cir. 1968); see also
Hoover v. United States Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing
the "entitlement of right" to discover substance of the expert's anticipated testimony under
rule 26(b)(4)(A)).
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whose area of expertise is foreign to the deposing attorney.12 7
Strategic concerns also may play an important role in defining
the scope of questioning an expert receives during a deposition.
12 8
Because attorneys sometimes are unknowledgeable in an expert's
specialty, they may choose not to question or challenge the expert
on certain matters until they can familiarize themselves with the
expert's ideas through further research or consultation with their
own experts. Similarly, counsel also may limit cross-examination of
an expert to avoid revealing information that he has gathered
while preparing his case,129 thereby forcing the opponent to elicit
this information through its own discovery measures.
By asserting that parties have an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine and rebut an expert's testimony while deposing him,
courts completely ignore the reasons that compel parties to depose
expert witnesses and the realities of the deposition process. The
judicial theory that parties waive their right to cross-examine a de-
posed expert witness who later becomes unavailable by not cross-
examining the expert with full vigor during the deposition is even
more untenable. 30 Parties often lack sufficient preparation while
taking depositions before trial to cross-examine party-opponents'
expert witnesses effectively. In fact, the desire to prepare for cross-
examination often is the key factor that motivates a party to de-
pose a witness. By admitting discovery depositions of expert wit-
nesses against discovering parties under rule 32(a)(3), therefore,
courts not only have controverted the essential information-gather-
ing and surprise-squelching purposes of pretrial discovery, but also
effectively and erroneously have eliminated the process of deposing
the witnesses of a party-opponent as a pretrial discovery tech-
nique. Instead, the courts effectively have recharacterized deposing
of witnesses as an extension of formal trial proceedings which pre-
sume that the deposing party has engaged in full pretrial prepara-
tion. This ill-founded scenario is particularly egregious when the
deposed witness is an expert whose testimony encompasses knowl-
edge of which the deposing party is ignorant.
127. An expert, by definition, is well-versed in the particular matters of his testimony.
Opposing counsel, even after availing himself of self-education, usually lacks sufficient prep-
aration to discredit the expert's testimony.
128. See Kennelly, Pretrial Discovery-The Courts and Trial Lawyers Are Finally
Discovering That Too Much of It Can Be Counterproductive, 21 TRIAL LAW. GumH 458,
474-89 (1977).
129. "Pretrial interrogation may serve only to educate the witness so that cross-exami-
nation becomes ineffectual at trial." Id. at 480.
130. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 4, at 159-66.
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2. Practical Implications of the Expert Witness
Deposition Problem
(a) Potential for Abuse
In most cases concerning the expert witness deposition prob-
lem under rule 32(a)(3), the parties either did not expect the de-
posed witness to become unavailable or they anticipated the un-
availability and took the expert's deposition to preserve the
evidence.131 Rule 32(a)(3), however, allows a party to permit oppo-
nents to depose his witness for discovery purposes while he never
intends to compel the witness' presence at trial. Similarly, a party
could choose this strategy after a party-opponent completes the
deposition. A decision to submit the deposition into evidence and
not to produce the witness to testify, especially in the context of
expert witnesses, abuses the equitable purposes of discovery under
the Federal Rules, particularly when the party who seeks admis-
sion of the deposition has identified the expert as a trial witness.32
In this situation the deposed party effectively has placed the dis-
covering party in a trial-type situation that erroneously presumes
the discovering party has prepared fully for cross-examination of
the expert, and depositions occurring under these circumstances
generally favor the deposed party.1 "
(b) Inhibition of Discovery
As the appellant argued in Savoie v. LaFourche Boat Rentals,
Inc.,' " courts discourage parties from deposing the expert wit-
nesses of party-opponents by admitting these depositions into evi-
dence if the witnesses later become unavailable to testify at trial.135
Courts in such cases clearly have stated that parties who depose an
opponent's expert witness must anticipate the possibility of the
witness subsequently becoming unavailable, thereby necessitating
admission of the deposition against them."' These courts, how-
ever, ironically are forcing discovering parties to be fully prepared
to cross-examine the party-opponent's expert witness at a stage in
131. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying note 30.
133. Questioning that attempts to record the expert's opinion and the basis for it often
does not elicit any significant discrediting testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Interna-
tional Business Mach., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134. 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. See supra note 108.
136. See Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. International Business Mach., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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pretrial discovery that should be producing the information neces-
sary to prepare for such cross-examination. Because parties usually
lack sufficient information to engage in meaningful cross-examina-
tion of expert witnesses before deposing them, courts in this situa-
tion effectively are discouraging parties from deposing an oppo-
nent's expert witnesses.
B. Potential Solutions to the Expert Witness
Deposition Problem
Future courts, parties, and rulemakers could employ several
strategies to reduce the chances of parties using discovery deposi-
tions of expert witnesses against discovering parties at trial and to
reduce the degree of unfairness that stems from such use. These
strategies include the following: (1) court orders limiting the use of
depositions at trial; (2) stipulation by the parties that limits the
use of depositions to discovery; (3) cautionary instructions by the
trial judge warning jurors to scrutinize deposition evidence care-
fully; (4) a stricter judicial test for determining unavailability of
expert witnesses; (5) local court rules that mitigate unfair use of
expert witness depositions; and (6) amendment to the Federal
Rules addressing the expert witness deposition problem. Courts,
legislators, and rulemakers who currently are considering the
problems with and potential reforms of the discovery process
should consider adopting one or more of these approaches to pro-
tect parties who wish to depose a party-opponent's expert witness
against unfairness. Similarly, trial counsel operating under the
Federal Rules or similar state rules should recognize the limited
protections that already exist.
1. Court Orders Limiting Use of Depositions
District courts possess broad discretionary powers to make
discovery and evidentiary rulings in the interest of conducting fair
and orderly trials.137 This discretion includes "the power to exclude
or admit expert testimony.., and to exclude testimony of wit-
nesses whose use at trial is in bad faith or would unfairly prejudice
an opposing party."13 8 This Note advocates that the unfairness in-
herent in using the discovery deposition of an expert witness
against the deposing party constitutes a colorable claim of
137. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217-18 (D. Del. 1960);
Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 313, 314 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
138. See cases cited supra note 137.
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prejudice against which a judge could exercise his discretionary
powers by excluding the deposition from evidence. Procedurally,
parties may seek such a court order pursuant to the "protective
order" provision of rule 26(c) before deposing the expert witness.13 9
The moving party simply should show the court that it lacks suffi-
cient preparation to conduct extensive cross-examination and ac-
cordingly, that the court should limit the deposition's use to dis-
covery purposes.
Although the judicial power to issue protective orders is dis-
cretionary, at least two reasons make it unlikely that courts will
issue such orders against the use of expert witness depositions at
trial. First, past judicial treatment of expert witness discovery dep-
ositions indicates an unwillingness to recognize any distinction be-
tween discovery and evidentiary depositions. 140 Because courts tra-
ditionally have not distinguished these types of depositions and
have not acknowledged the prejudice that results from using dis-
covery depositions against deposing parties, courts probably would
refuse to order any limitations on the use of depositions. Second,
some courts might construe explicit unavailability provisions in
rule 32(a) to prohibit this type of protective order.141 Nevertheless,
discovering parties still should seek protective orders because, even
if a court denies the party's motion, the mere attempt to restrict
use of the deposition bolsters any subsequent argument of
prejudice that the discovering party can make if his opponent later
tries to offer the deposition into evidence. A discovering party
could argue that he had not waived his right to cross-examine the
unavailable witness because he had notified the court prior to tak-
ing the deposition that he was limiting his questioning to discov-
ery. A court, however, could argue that its denial of the motion put
counsel on notice of the deposition's potential use at trial and that
the party therefore had waived his opportunity to cross-examine
the expert witness. Thus, because courts issue protective orders in
only limited circumstances, they do not protect discovering parties
adequately. 142
139. Rule 26(c) provides in pertinent part- "Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 44-86 and accompanying text.
142. Another argument in favor of protective orders is that courts increasingly have
exercised control over the discovery phase of litigation. See Sherman & Kinnard, Federal
Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 247, 269 (1979). This
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2. Stipulation by the Parties
Another strategic option currently available to discovering
parties is stipulation with party-opponents limiting the use of ex-
pert witness depositions to discovery.143 To make such a stipula-
tion, discovering parties should request that party-opponents join
them in submitting a written stipulation which states that neither
party intends to introduce the deposition into evidence. The obvi-
ous problem with stipulations is that an opponent simply may re-
fuse to enter into the agreement. As a practical matter, the party
who hired the deposed expert witness should try to preserve the
right to use the deposition at trial if the expert witness subse-
quently becomes unavailable. Thus, stipulations essentially are al-
most perfect"4 protective devices that parties seldom agree to use.
If both parties seek to depose their opponents' expert witnesses,
however, the likelihood that they will reach a stipulation agree-
ment is substantially higher than if only one party deposes an ex-
pert because both parties may wish to prevent the other's use of
the deposition at trial.
3. Cautionary Instructions
Judges can use cautionary instructions to warn juries to scruti-
nize evidence from expert witness depositions more carefully than
live trial testimony because proper cross-examination of the depo-
nents was impossible. Courts theoretically can prevent any
prejudice resulting from admission of an expert witness deposition
by issuing such instructions.1'4 Two problems, however, make cau-
tionary instructions an inadequate protection against prejudice.
First, courts probably will not issue cautionary instructions con-
cerning the reliability of deposition evidence because of the hold-
development, however, does not portend necessarily increased judicial sympathy for parties
facing the expert witness deposition problem.
143. Very little authority exists concerning availability of this type of stipulation. If
parties stipulated that they would use a certain deposition only for discovery purposes, how-
ever, the court apparently would have to exclude it from evidence. See Stevens v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 157 Ky. 561, 570, 163 S.W. 747, 751 (1914). Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits stipulations waiving the procedural requirements of depositions. FED. R.
Civ. P. 29. Parties frequently use rule 29 to make a deposition admissible despite noncom-
pliance with procedural formalities. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2091 (1970).
144. Courts have a discretionary power to set aside stipulations. See FED. R. Civ. P.
29.
145. See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L.
Rav. 264, 264 (1966).
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ing in Wright Root Beer""6 that such cautionary instructions con-
stitute reversible error. 147 Although the Fifth Circuit cited no
authority in Wright Root Beer for the proposition that the trial
court may not issue cautionary instructions concerning admission
of an unavailable witness' deposition,14 8 no subsequent decisions
have limited the Wright Root Beer holding. Second, empirical
studies cast substantial doubt on the effectiveness of cautionary
instructions. Typically, cautionary instructions limit the jury's con-
sideration of evidence to the use for which the evidence is compe-
tent.1 49 Various studies, however, have suggested that cautionary
instructions do not influence juries significantly to limit their con-
sideration of questioned evidence. 150 In fact, one study suggests
that a judge's cautionary instructions to a jury actually sensitize
the jury to the evidence.151 Furthermore, many "learned jurists"
have concluded that limiting instructions are useless because jurors
cannot distinguish proper and improper uses of evidence, even if
they remember and fully understand the limiting instructions.1 52
Thus, parties should not rely on cautionary instructions as the sole
protection against use of discovery depositions at trial. Rather,
parties probably should request cautionary instructions only as a
last resort when they believe a court will not exclude the
deposition.
4. A Stricter Test for Unavailability of Expert Witnesses
The ease with which a party can show unavailability of a de-
posed witness under rule 32(a)(3) and then use the deposition at
trial against the deposing party is the primary cause of the expert
witness deposition problem.153 In Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte'"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sug-
146. 414 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969).
147. For a discussion of the Wright Root Beer decision see notes 97-108 and accompa-
nying text.
148. Wright Root Beer, 414 F.2d at 890-91. See E. DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR, 2 FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 72.02 (2d ed. 1970). Contra Treharne v. Callahan, 426
F.2d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1970); Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. at 117-18.
149. For example, a court may admit a hearsay statement if the party offers it for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the statement itself. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c) advi-
sory committee note.
150. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. RPv. 744
(1959); Note, supra note 145, at 265-69.
151. Broeder, supra note 150, at 754.
152. See Note, supra note 145, at 267 n.18 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 44-86 and accompanying text.
154. 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
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gested that "there is something unusual about the use of the prior
testimony of an expert witness that calls for further scrutiny of his
unavailability." 155 The court recognized that when a party previ-
ously has hired an expert witness for various purposes, the court
should not label that expert "unavailable" because the party chose
not to arrange for the expert's presence at trial.156 The Second Cir-
cuit, therefore, was advocating implicitly a stricter test for deter-
mining unavailability of an expert witness under rule 32(a)(3).
A stricter unavilability test is sensible for two reasons. First, a
stricter test would place a heavier burden of proving unavailability
on parties seeking to use an expert witness deposition at trial and,
consequently, would reduce the chance of parties abusing the un-
availability rule. 57 Under a stricter unavailability test for expert
witnesses, courts could require parties to give more compelling rea-
sons than mere distance to justify a witness' absence. Second, by
adopting a stricter unavailability test in civil cases, courts would
not be dealing with an unfamiliar requirement because a strict un-
availability test already is operative for all witnesses in criminal
cases.
1 58
Despite the potential benefits of a stricter unavailability re-
quirement, however, courts are unlikely to adopt this standard be-
cause the Carter-Wallace decision has had only a limited impact
in this area.159 An amendment to the Federal Rules probably
would be a prerequisite to the widespread adoption of a stricter
unavailability test for expert witnesses.
5. Local Court Rules
Federal district court judges may adopt by majority action
rules governing local practice that are consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.1 60 Thus, district courts potentially could
frame local rules that mitigate in a variety of ways unfair use of
155. Id. at 536. The special qualities of expert testimony augment the argument that
use of discovery deposition testimony of experts is unfair.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d
792, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Mann, 590
F.2d 361, 365-68 (1st Cir. 1978); FaD. R. Cram. P. 15(a).
159. No courts have adopted the stricter standard of unavailability that Carter-Wal-
lace implies, perhaps because that court held that the lower court's failure to impose such a
standard was harmless error. See Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346, 348
(E.D. Ky. 1976).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
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expert witness discovery depositions. A rule that required parties
to designate the purpose of all expert depositions and that prohib-
ited parties from introducing "discovery" depositions into evidence
certainly would curtail the expert witness deposition problem.
Similarly, a rule requiring parties to make binding designations at
a time before completion of discovery concerning which deposi-
tions they would introduce into evidence at least would offer the
discovering party a chance to conduct a second deposition with full
cross-examination. The district courts also could adopt other strat-
egies for addressing this problem with local rules, such as caution-
ary instructions or a stricter unavailability standard.
The principle difficulty in solving the expert witness deposi-
tion problem with local rules is that they must be consistent with
the Federal Rules.161 Arguably, any locally imposed limitation on
the operation of rule 32(a) would be invalid as inconsistent with
the Federal Rules.162 District courts could avoid this problem by
making enforcement of the local rule discretionary. 6 ' A discretion-
ary local rule, however, would provide no more protection than al-
ready is available under a protective order.' The doubtful success
of local rules solving the expert witness deposition problem and
the lack of uniformity among local rules that probably would occur
throughout the district courts make local rule changes an unsatis-
factory solution to this problem.
6. Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
An amendment to the Federal Rules offers the most uniform
and effective approach for resolving the expert witness deposition
problem. Again, several possible approaches might work. The Ad-
visory Committee could recommend an amendment to rule 32 that
required courts to distinguish between discovery and evidentiary
depositions. The amendment could exclude from the current ad-
missibility provisions of rule 32 any deposition that a party takes
expressly for discovery purposes. Alternatively, a revised rule 32
could require courts to treat admissibility of expert witness and
nonexpert witness depositions differently, perhaps by providing
that courts never can consider expert witnesses unavailable for
161. Id.
162. The language of rule 32 does not imply a limitation concerning the type of depo-
sition admissible under its provisions. See supra notes 44-86.
163. Cf. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 142, at 264 n.76 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the validity of local rules limiting the total number of interrogatories).
164. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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trial under rule 32(a). This amendment effectively would allow
parties to introduce expert witness depositions only by agreement.
The best solution to the expert witness deposition problem is
to amend rule 26(b)(4), which already governs discovery of expert
witnesses. Rule 26(b)(4) recognizes that parties need an adequate
opportunity for discovery of expert witnesses before trial to cross-
examine and rebut their testimony at trial.'65 To achieve this end,
rule 26(b)(4)(A) permits parties to discover any expert witness that
a party-opponent expects to call as a witness at trial. An amend-
ment to rule 26(b)(4) could make the deposition process fair for
deposing and deposed parties by specifying that if a deposed ex-
pert whom a party had designated to be a trial witness subse-
quently became unavailable to testify at trial, any deposition
which a party-opponent previously took of the expert would be
inadmissible upon motion pursuant to rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) or by
agreement with the other party. This amendment simply would
make binding the designation of an expert as a trial witness and
would prevent deposed parties from using the discovery efforts of
deposing parties as evidence. An amendment of this type would
not prejudice parties who want to call expert witnesses to testify at
trial because they still would retain the option of preserving the
expert's testimony through direct examination during depositions
as protection against subsequent unavailability of the witness. If a
party should choose to preserve expert testimony in this manner,
the opponent would at least be on notice of the deposition's in-
tended use and would have an opportunity to prepare for cross-
examination of the expert through discovery.
This proposed change in rule 26 would reorder priorities by
allowing the risk of an expert witness' becoming unavailable to fall
upon the proponent of the expert's testimony. Under the current
Federal Rules, an expert's absence probably is more harmful to the
opponent of the expert's testimony, who inadvertently may have
created unfavorable evidence by deposing the expert in prepara-
tion for trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The degree to which courts inhibit discovery and prejudice
parties by admitting expert witness depositions into evidence
under rule 32(a)(3) when the expert becomes unavailable to testify
at trial is difficult to measure. Because the subject matter of con-
165. See supra note 6.
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temporary civil litigation has become highly technical and com-
plex, parties increasingly have used expert witnesses at trial for a
variety of purposes. This phenomenon suggests that the expert
witness deposition problem should be a common problem in civil
cases in federal courts. Although only a few cases have addressed
this problem, their holdings probably discourage parties from argu-
ing against admission of expert witness depositions regardless of
how much the circumstances of a case favor inadmissibility.
The expert witness deposition problem presents a strong pos-
sibility of denying discovering parties an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine unavailable expert witnesses. During expert witness
depositions, parties usually seek information that will help them
prepare an effective strategy for cross-examining the expert at
trial. Thus, requiring deposing parties to cross-examine experts
during depositions, before they have acquired the information nec-
essary to conduct effective cross-examination, inevitably discour-
ages parties from deposing expert witnesses. The expert witness
deposition problem controverts one of the basic purposes underly-
ing the liberal system of discovery in federal courts-to "make a
trial less a game of blind man's buff [sic] and more a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent."" 6 In addition, courts, by perpetuating this problem, erro-
neously have eliminated the process of deposing a party-oppo-
nent's designated trial witnesses as a pretrial discovery technique
by effectively treating the process as an extension of formal trial
proceedings that presume the deposing party has prepared fully to
cross-examine the expert. Thus, courts and rulemakers should take
active steps to remedy the expert witness deposition problem be-
cause it threatens to undermine the process of deposing witnesses
before trial, one of the most important pretrial discovery tech-
niques available to parties in federal courts.
STEVEN D. PARMAN
166. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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